No. 062344C.Commonwealth of Massachusetts Superior Court. WORCESTER, SS.
September 20, 2007.
LEMIRE, JAMES R., J.
The defendants, FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., FedEx Home Delivery, and John Ciappi (collectively “FedEx”) move to stay this action, brought by Robert Williams (“Williams”), pending the outcome of certain cases proceeding in the federal courts. For the following reasons, the defendants’ motion is ALLOWED.
BACKGROUND
Williams was a FedEx delivery driver until his termination in December 2005. He alleges that FedEx wrongfully terminated him because of an on the job injury, in violation of Massachusetts anti-discrimination laws. Williams alleges employment discrimination under G.L.c. 151B. Alternatively, he alleges violation of G.L.c. 93, § 103, the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (“MERA”). In addition, Williams asserts a claim for misclassification of his employment status under the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Law, G.L.c. 149, § 148B.
Similar claims against Fed Ex have been asserted in numerous federal courts, including two cases filed in the District of Massachusetts.[2]
The Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (“MDL”) has consolidated many of these cases because they contain common “factual questions arising from the classification of certain package delivery drivers as independent contractors rather than employees.” In Re FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., Employment Practices Litigation (No. II), 381 F.Sup.2d 1380, “2-3 (J.P.M.L. 2005). Williams is a potential member of the putative class in
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one of the consolidated cases transferred to the MDL proceeding from the District of Massachusetts. Certification of that class is pending. Williams contends that, if certified, he will opt-out of the class and pursue his claims in this court.
DISCUSSION
FedEx seeks a stay of this action pending the outcome of the MDL, in order to avoid a waste of judicial resources, duplicative discovery, and the risk of inconsistent outcomes. Specifically, FedEx seeks to avoid litigating the employment classification issue in both federal and state court, where different results could occur. The Supreme Court set forth the following standard by which courts must assess a motion to stay:
[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance . . . Only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one cause be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both.
Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936). Here, the court must assess whether FedEx’s interest in avoiding duplicative proceedings, and potentially conflicting legal rulings, outweighs Williams’ interest in proceeding with his claims in this court without delay.
In support of his opposition, Williams contends that federal litigation over the employment classification issue has no relevance to the outcome of his case in this court, because he can prevail on his discrimination claims regardless of his employment status.[3] In essence, Williams argues that because G.L.c. 93, § 103 prohibits discrimination against all persons, and G.L.c. 151B prohibits discrimination against employees, he is protected no matter what his employment status is.
However, Williams’ rights as a non-employee, or independent contractor, are more limited. G.L.c. 93, § 103 states that “[a]ny person within the commonwealth, regardless of handicap . . . shall, with reasonable accommodation, have the same rights as other persons to make and enforce contracts . . .? Until 1991, “[42 U.S.C. §] 1981 [which is the federal counterpart to the MERA] was read literally as [prohibiting discrimination with respect] only to the making and enforcement of contracts, and `enforcement’ was read narrowly to include only enforcement by legal process.” Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Store,. Inc., 178 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original), citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1989). In applying this narrow interpretation to the phrase “make and enforce contracts,” it is not clear whether Williams could prevail on the theory that FedEx violated his rights under the MERA in the absence of allegations that FedEx discriminated against him in the making of, or enforcement of, his contract.[4]
Although this court makes no determinations regarding Williams’ MERA claim, it appears that G.L.c. 151B would afford him greater rights. To proceed under G.L.c. 151B, however, Williams must first establish that he was a FedEx employee.[5] This threshold legal issue is identical to the issue being litigated in the MDL, and this court finds that it is material to the outcome of Williams’ claims in this case. Thus, the court rejects Williams’ contention that the employment classification question is unrelated, or irrelevant to his discrimination claims.
Beyond the existence of a common legal question Williams acknowledges that the factual allegations surrounding his employment status are identical in both this action and the federal actions. Williams argues that this commonality weighs against a stay because no duplicative discovery on the issue will be required in this proceeding.[6]
Williams argues that the only discovery required in this case will relate to the specific circumstances surrounding his termination, which are not at issue in the MDL. However, even assuming that no additional discovery is required with respect to the misclassification issue proceeding with this case will result in multiple adjudications of the issue in different courts, with potentially conflicting results.[7]
This situation is precisely why the court has discretion to stay this proceeding, in order to promote the orderly and efficient disposition of the matters before it.
As discussed above, none of Williams’ claims can be resolved absent a determination of his employment status, which is squarely at issue in the MDL. Given that the MDL proceedings appear to be progressing at a fair pace,[8] and that Williams’ own attorneys are representing the Massachusetts plaintiffs in those proceedings, it is not unreasonable to stay this action temporarily so as to allow the federal courts a chance to address the classification issue.[9] Indeed, a ruling favorable to Williams in the federal action may have preclusive effect on FedEx in this action, thereby strengthening Williams’ discrimination claims and negating the need for multiple determinations of identical issues.
Finally, Williams argues that a Massachusetts court should decide the classification issue as a matter of first impression. The Massachusetts Independent Contractor Law, G.L.c. 149. § 148B, was enacted in July 2004. Williams claims that, due to the unique standards set forth in the statute, and the lack of cases construing it, it would be most appropriate for a Massachusetts court to decide the issue. However, Williams has offered no argument why a federal court
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would be unable to properly apply the new Massachusetts law.[10] See Fidler v. E.M. Parker Co. . 394 Mass. 534, 542 (1985) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that she should be allowed to relitigate a novel issue of state law simply because it was decided by a federal court). In sum, this court concludes that the risk of important Massachusetts’ policies being ignored in the MDL is minimal, and does not weigh against a stay of these proceedings.
ORDER
For the above-stated reasons, the Defendants’ Motion to Stay Pending Parallel Federal Multi-District Litigation Proceeding is ALLOWED.
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