LOCAL 1652, INTL. ASSOC. OF FIREFIGHTERS v. FRAMINGHAM, 442 Mass. 463 (2004)

813 N.E.2d 543

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Middlesex.April 8, 2004.
August 16, 2004.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, SOSMAN, CORDY, JJ.

Statute, Appropriation of money. Municipal Corporations, Budget, Collective bargaining, Town meeting.

This court concluded that town officials could not fulfil their obligation under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), by submitting to town meeting a budget that made full funding of a staffing provision contained in a multi-year collective bargaining agreement contingent on a potential property tax override pursuant to G.L. c. 59, § 21C. [467-478] SOSMAN, J., dissenting, with whom MARSHALL, C.J., and CORDY, J., joined.

CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 8, 2002.

The case was heard by Leila R. Kern, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

Leo J. Peloquin Christopher J. Petrini, Town Counsel, for the defendant.

Harold L. Lichten for the plaintiff.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Patrick N. Bryant for Massachusetts Coalition of Police.

Philip Collins Daniel C. Brown for Massachusetts Municipal Association.

IRELAND, J.

We transferred this case to this court on our own

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motion to consider whether town officials may fulfil their obligation under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), by submitting a budget that makes full funding of a staffing provision contained in a multiyear collective bargaining agreement contingent on town voters approving a “Proposition 2 ½” override (override) to cover a budget shortfall (G.L. c. 59, § 21C). In Billerica v International Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1495, 415 Mass. 692
(1993) (Billerica), at issue was the enforceability of a minimum staffing provision contained in a multiyear collective bargaining agreement. In the second year of that agreement, the town’s administrator failed to submit a request to the town meeting for funding the provision. Id. at 693. The court held, inter alia, that such a request had to be submitted to the town meeting pursuant to G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), and, in the absence of such a submission, the fire fighters’ remedy was to “seek a court order compelling the town administrator . . . to submit [such] request.” Id. at 696.

In this case, a Superior Court judge, pursuant to Billerica, supra, granted the request of the plaintiff union for a preliminary injunction ordering town officials to submit a request for full funding of a minimum staffing provision in the third year of the fire fighters’ three-year collective bargaining agreement. Town officials had submitted a budget that made full funding of the staffing provision contingent on the town’s voters passing an override to cover a budget shortfall. See G.L. c. 59, § 21C, inserted by St. 1980, c. 580, § 1. We conclude that town officials may not fulfil their obligation under G.L. c. 150E, § 7
(b), by submitting a budget that makes full funding of a staffing provision contingent on a potential property tax override pursuant to G.L. c. 59, § 21C.

Facts and procedural background. The basic facts are not in dispute. The town and the union entered into a three-year collective bargaining agreement covering July 1, 2000, until June 30, 2003. The only provision relevant to our discussion is art. III, § 7, which required a minimum staffing level of thirty fire fighters on each shift (staffing provision). The staffing provision became an issue in fiscal year 2002, when there was a projected budget shortfall of approximately seven per cent. In April, 2002, town officials prepared a budget to submit to the town meeting

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that did not call for unconditional full funding of the staffing provision. Instead, town officials proposed a contingency budget and an alternative balanced budget. The contingency budget included full funding of the fire fighters’ staffing provision, only if the voters approved an override to fund the budget shortfall. The balanced budget, proposed in the event that an override failed, called for a reduction of approximately seven per cent from all town departments, including the fire department.

In material submitted to the town meeting members, town officials “recommended” the contingency budget. In the section of its budget that specifically covered the fire department’s operating budget, the staffing provision was discussed as follows:

“It is important to keep in mind that the Firefighters Contract contains a staffing provision that calls for 30 (thirty) firefighters, including 6 (six) officers, to be on duty at all time. The balanced budget, as presently constituted, cannot maintain that level of staffing. This staffing provision can be funded by the contingency budget, which is the recommendation. If a member of Town Meeting desires to assure funding in the balanced budget that is sufficient to fund the staffing provision, the member should make the appropriate motion to have Town Meeting re-allocate $725,837 of funding from other municipal budgets to the Fire Department budget.”

The contingency budget’s proposed override would have funded not only the shortfall for the fire fighters’ staffing provision, but also the shortfall in all departments. Moreover, if the override did not pass and the balanced budget was adopted, the fire fighters stood to lose fourteen positions, thereby affecting the staffing provision.

Prior to the town meeting at which the budget was to be discussed, the union requested a preliminary injunction requiring town officials to submit a budget that fully funded the staffing provision. In granting the union’s request, the judge noted that the relevant provision of the Proposition 2 ½ statute, G.L. c. 59, § 21C (m), addressed the legislative branch (in this case, the town meeting), whereas G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), addressed

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the executive branch.[2] Relying on the statutes and the holding in Billerica, supra, the judge stated that town officials could not fulfil their obligation to submit a budget containing full funding for the staffing provision, under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), by proposing an override to cover the shortfall. Citing the Billerica case, the judge concluded that seeking an injunction was the union’s sole remedy. She noted that the town meeting was not required to fund the staffing provision request fully.

The town appealed from the judge’s decision to grant the preliminary injunction and enter a declaratory judgment to the Appeals Court. Meanwhile, town officials complied with the order. They proposed full funding of the staffing provision with the shortfall covered by a rubbish removal fee. The town meeting voted to approve the funding. Ultimately, the rubbish removal fee was not instituted because the town’s voters approved an override that fully funded the staffing provision. The union filed a motion to dismiss the town’s appeal of the injunction because the issue was moot. The motion was denied.[3]

Before turning to our discussion, we note that because the issue whether the injunction was proper is moot, it would serve no purpose to analyze the judge’s decision pursuant to the standard of review set out in Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 615 (1980). Instead, if only because it is capable of repetition, we focus on the salient legal issue Boston Herald, Inc. v. Superior Court Dep’t of the Trial Court, 421 Mass. 502, 504 (1995). See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 419 Mass. 630, 631 n. 2 (1995), and cases cited (where issue is of significant public importance, consideration of moot case is matter of judicial discretion).

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Discussion.[4] The town does not dispute that, under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), it had an obligation to submit a request to the town meeting for full funding of the staffing provision. Rather, the town asserts that the part of its contingent budget that relied on an override met the requirements of G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b). The town argues, in essence, that nothing in the language of either statute prevents town officials from using the override statute to fulfil their obligation under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b).

1. G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b). The union points out that, under the contingent budget, the only way full funding could have been considered by the town meeting was if a town meeting member took the town’s advice to “make the appropriate motion . . . to re-allocate . . . funding from other municipal budgets to the Fire Department.” The union contends that the plain language of G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), as well as decided cases, support its argument that town officials had to submit an unconditional request for full funding of the staffing provision for a vote by the town meeting. We agree.

“General Laws, c. 150E is a comprehensive scheme which governs the collective bargaining rights of public employees” and “promotes harmonious and cooperative relationships between government and its employees.” Boston Teachers Union, Local 66
v. Boston, 382 Mass. 553, 559, 564 (1981), quoting 1973 House Doc. No. 6194, Appendix B. General Laws c. 150E, does not require municipalities to negotiate with unions over staffing provisions. See Billerica, supra at 694; Boston Teachers Union, Local 66
v. School Comm. of Boston, 386 Mass. 197, 212 n. 20 (1982) Town of Danvers, 3 M.L.C. 1559, 1571, 1573 (1977) (discussing public policy reasons public employer must have flexibility to manage its operations; minimum staffing permissive, not mandatory, subject of negotiation). Moreover, once a staffing provision becomes part of a collective bargaining agreement and is approved by the local legislative body (G.L. c. 150E, § 7
[b]), it is enforceable for only one fiscal year. Billerica, supra. Cf. G.L. c. 150E, § 6 (listing mandatory subjects of collective bargaining); Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v School Comm. of Boston, supra at

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203-209 (salary increases are enforceable in multi-year collective bargaining agreement).

In the Billerica case, the court concluded that an arbitrator exceeded his authority when he ordered the town to fund its fire fighters’ staffing provision for a second year without the town’s legislative body first appropriating necessary funds. Id. at 693, 696. The court held that, without the town’s agreement to fund a second year, the arbitrator’s order infringed on the town’s managerial prerogative to determine staffing levels. Id.
at 694-695, citing Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Comm. of Boston, supra at 200-201, 213 (no lay-off clause in teachers’ collective bargaining agreement). See also Billerica, supra
at 695, citing Saugus v. Newbury, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 611, 614-615
(1983) (fire fighters’ job security provision not enforceable against town in second year where town meeting declined to appropriate funds).[5]

However, the court also held that “the law [G.L. c. 150E, § 7
(b)] required that a request for an appropriation necessary to fund the agreement for its second year be presented to the town meeting for action” (emphasis added). Billerica, supra at 696. As noted above, the court stated that the union’s remedy was to seek a court order against the town administrator. Id.

Once town officials submit a request for appropriation, however, a town meeting has no obligation to fund it. Saugus v Newbury, supra at 614-615. County of Suffolk v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 127, 130-133 (1983) (Labor Relations commission does not have power to order funding of collective bargaining agreement; legislative body must appropriate). Cf. Labor Relations Comm’n v. Selectmen of Dracut, 374 Mass. 619, 627-629 (1978) (once funds for collective bargaining agreement are appropriated, future town meeting may not rescind them).

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The town argues that its contingent budget was proper even under the holding in the Billerica case because, whereas Billerica town officials failed to submit any funding request, the town did submit a funding request (albeit with some of the funding to come from an override). We reject the town’s attempt to confine the holding in the Billerica case to its facts, because nowhere in the plain language of the statute does it indicate that a contingent request is allowed. Rather, § 7 (b) states that the employer “shall submit to the appropriate legislative body . . . a request for an appropriation necessary to fund the cost items contained therein.” Moreover, our conclusion is supported by a number of other cases, in addition to the Billerica case. See e.g., Town of Belmont, 22 M.L.C. 1636, 1639-1640, 1641 (1996) (two selectmen who signed collective bargaining agreement, but spoke against minimum staffing provision in capacity as town meeting members, violated obligation under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 [b], to support the provision before town meeting); City of Chelsea, 13 M.L.C. 1144, 1150-1151 (1986) (where agreement had staffing provision, holding parties to “totality of their bargain promotes more stable and predictable labor relations”); Local 1032, IAFF, 9 M.L.C. 1792, 1796 (1983) (bad faith where city manager refused to submit funding for fire department’s staffing provision); City of Medford, IAFF, 6 M.L.C. 2129, 2130-2131 (1980) (where statute allows city council to vote to override tax cap, city manager cannot refuse to submit budget for full funding of provision to fill vacancies in fire department); Town of Kingston, 6 M.L.C. 1388, 1389 (1979) (ordering town officials to support warrant to fund career incentive clause in collective bargaining agreement at town meeting; insufficient funds not an excuse where the provision allowed options besides direct appropriation).[6]
But see Labor Relations Comm’n v. Selectmen of Dracut, 374 Mass. 619, 623,

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625-626 (1978) (commission cannot force successor public officials to support a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by predecessors; court took no position regarding validity of commission’s order that selectmen take steps necessary to fund collective bargaining agreement).

Given the plain language of G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), and this case history, we conclude that the town was required to submit a budget that unconditionally and fully funded the staffing provision.[7] For the same reasons, we also reject the town’s argument that it satisfied its statutory obligation to submit a request to fund fully the staffing provision by its express reminder to the town meeting members that they could “make the appropriate motion” to fund the staffing provision fully.

We now address our conclusion that G.L. c. 59, § 21C, enacted after G.L. c. 150E, has no impact on the town officials’ obligation to submit an unconditional funding request.[8]

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2. Impact of G.L. c. 59, § 21C, on the town officials’ obligation under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b).

General Laws, c. 59, § 21C, popularly known as Proposition 2 ½, was enacted in 1980. St. 1980, c. 580, § 1, as amended. General Laws, c. 59, § 21C (a), states, in relevant part: “Whenever used in the text of this section, the following words and terms shall have the following meanings: . . . `[l]ocal appropriating authority’, in a town, the board of selectmen. . . .” The statute uses the words “local appropriating authority” several times. See, e.g., G.L. c. 59, § 21C, pars. (e), (g), (h), (i), (i ½), (j), (k), (n). However, G.L. c. 59, § 21C (m), which enumerates sources of appropriations available to a town, does not use the words “local appropriating authority.”[9]
Instead par. (m) states, in pertinent part:

“A town may appropriate from the tax levy, from available funds, or from borrowing, contingent on the passage of a ballot question under paragraph (g), (i ½) or (k), but . . . no election at which the question appears on the ballot shall take place later than September 15 following the

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date of an appropriation vote adopted at an annual town meeting, or 90 days after the date of the close of any other town meeting at which an appropriation vote was adopted” (emphasis added).[10]

3. Impact of G.L. c. 59, § 21C, on town’s obligations under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b).

The town submitted the contingent budget to the town meeting pursuant to G.L. c. 59, § 21C (m). The town admits that par. (m) gives the town meeting, not town officials, the power to make appropriations contingent on an override. Paragraph (m) also enumerates the paragraphs under which a ballot question may be brought to voters so that the contingent appropriation could be funded. The ballot question would be proposed by the “local appropriating authority” (i.e., town officials) pursuant to those enumerated paragraphs. See note 10, supra. As the town points out, in this case, town officials would have proposed an override pursuant to par. (g). The plain language of par. (m) does not address contingent budgets proposed by town officials in any way.

Nevertheless, the town asserts, in essence, that G.L. c. 59, § 21C (m), changes its obligations under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b). It does not point to any language anywhere in the override statute that grants town officials the authority to submit a budget contingent on an override. Instead, it argues that the town’s registered voters and the town meeting jointly make up the legislative body of the town and, therefore, the two would “make the funding decision” jointly through an override. The town points to Town of Swampscott, 2 M.L.C. 1531, 1532 (1976), arguing that the case “reinforces the role of the electorate’s power to make the ultimate determination with respect to appropriations.” In the Swampscott case, the town meeting appropriated funds to implement a collective bargaining

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agreement with the police department. In what the Labor Relations Commission (commission) called “an unfortunate disregard for the spirit if not the letter of [G.L. c. 150E],” members of school committee petitioned under G.L. c. 43A, § 10, to put the funding decision before the voters, who overturned it. Because the school committee was not the employer under G.L. c. 150E, the school committee’s “unwonted interference with the orderly process of a collective bargaining” could not be held against the town. Thus, the commission was precluded from granting the union’s request for a complaint against the town. Id. at 1531. However, the commission, citing town officials’ obligation to submit a request for full funding of a collective bargaining agreement, “strongly suggest[ed]” that the town officials resubmit and actively support the funding warrant at the next town meeting. Id. at 1532.

This case does not help the town because it did not involve either the override statute, which was enacted after the case was decided, or a situation where town meeting members, at the request of town officials, partially funded a staffing provision and left it to the voters to determine whether there would be full funding of a collective bargaining agreement.[11]
Moreover, the strong language used by the commission in objecting to what the school committee did underscores the principle that town officials must continue to support funding of a collective bargaining agreement even where voters have expressed their desire not to fund it. See id. at 1531 (“These [school] committees have, in too many instances, failed to realize that the old order has changed, and that [G.L. c. 150E] has mandated a new approach to personnel matters”).[12]

The town also argues that cases interpreting G.L. c.

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150E, § 7 (b), have allowed towns to use alternative sources of funding for collective bargaining agreements and, therefore, they properly used the override statute for such purpose. We agree with the union that the cases on which the town relies are inapposite because they do not involve a source of funding outside of a direct request by a public employer to a legislative body for full funding of a contractual agreement. The town relies on City of Medford, 6 M.L.C. 2129 (1980). In that case, the city manager refused to submit a full funding request of a collective bargaining agreement claiming that to do so would exceed a mandatory tax cap pursuant to St. 1979, c. 151. Id. at 2130. However, part of the statute allowed the city council itself to vote to override the tax cap. Id. at 2131. The commission held that the city manager had violated G.L. c. 150E, by refusing to submit a request for full funding and precluded the city council from exercising their specific statutory authority. It is important to note that the existence of a tax cap statute did not affect the city manager’s obligation under the statute to request full funding.

Regarding the other cases cited by the town, it is true that the commission stated that it would not dictate the specific method of full funding that must be requested of the legislative body. Nevertheless, in each case, the commission reiterated the principle that the “employer” is obligated to submit a full funding request to the legislative body. See Town of Rockland, 16

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M.L.C. 1001, 1005 (1989); City of Medford, 9 M.L.C. 1792, 1795-1796 (1983). In fact, in Worcester Sch. Comm., 5 M.L.C. 1080, 1084 (1978), the commission found that the school committee violated the statute’s requirement to bargain in good faith where it proposed funding a contract by a method it knew would fail (i.e., through a supplemental appropriation presented to the city council). The school committee was obligated to seek other funding methods.[13]

The town argues, in essence, that the override statute may be used to fund a staffing provision because it is not among the statutes listed in G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (d), as being superseded by provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. This argument also lacks merit.

General Laws c. 150E, § 7 (d), states, in pertinent part:

“If a collective bargaining agreement reached by the employer and [union] contains a conflict between matters which are within the scope of negotiations pursuant to section six of this chapter and any municipal personnel ordinance, by-law, rule or regulation [list of regulations and statutes omitted] the terms of the collective bargaining agreement shall prevail” (emphasis added).

The plain language of G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (d), is not ambiguous. Therefore, “it must be interpreted according to its usual and natural meaning.” Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v Boston, 382 Mass. 553, 561 (1981). General Laws c. 150E, § 7
(d), covers “conflict[s]” between terms in collective bargaining agreements negotiated pursuant to G.L. c. 150E, § 6
(i.e., terms and conditions of employment, the subject of

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mandatory bargaining)[14] and municipal personnel
ordinances, bylaws, rules, or regulations.

Where a conflict has existed between the terms of a collective bargaining agreement and a statute concerning terms and conditions of employment, the statute has prevailed. See School Comm. of Natick v. Education Ass’n of Natick, 423 Mass. 34, 39
(1996) (statute concerning authority to appoint school coach, not listed in § 7 [d], supersedes collective bargaining agreement) National Ass’n of Gov’t Employees, Local R1-162 v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 542, 544 (1984) (no duty to bargain over matters covered by civil service statute accepted by town; if “statute specifically mandating certain terms and conditions of employment is not listed in § 7 [d], the statute cannot be super[s]eded by a bargaining agreement” [emphasis added]) School Comm. of Holyoke v. Duprey, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 58, 63-64
(1979) (where city never accepted statute concerning employee contribution to insurance premiums and statute not listed in § 7 [d], terms of collective bargaining agreement are unenforceable). See als Town of Danvers, 3 M.L.C. 1559, 1572 (1977) (“[§] 7 by its very language poses a dual test . . . a matter must be . . . within the scope of [§] 6 [and] it must be determined whether there is a conflict between that matter and the enumeration of [§] 7”); Labor Relations Comm’n v. Natick, 369 Mass. 431, 441-442 (1976) (discussing nature of the various statutes listed in § 7 [d]); Burlington v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 390 Mass. 157, 159-167 (1983) (where tradition and statutes establish that district attorneys have prosecutorial duties, no violation of G.L. c. 150E to relieve police prosecutors of duty, but impact of decision must be negotiated with union).

However, by its plain language, G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (d), limits the scope of statutes that may supersede terms of a collective bargaining agreement to those concerning terms and conditions

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of employment. Because the override statute does not concern a term and condition of employment, there is no “conflict” between it and the collective bargaining agreement within the meaning of § 7 (d).[15] Instead, the town faced a situation that all municipalities may face, a budget shortfall and the existence of contractual obligations that need to be funded. See Mendes v Taunton, 366 Mass. 109, 113-114 (1974) (where collective bargaining agreement’s salary provision not in direct conflict with plain language of municipal finance laws court will not endorse construction that would “render virtually ineffective” provision in law allowing three-year collective bargaining agreements).

The plain language of par. (m) does not authorize town officials to submit a budget contingent on an override. There is no merit in any of the arguments advanced by the town to the effect that the override statute nevertheless changes the obligation of town officials to submit a proposal for full funding of the staffing provision under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b). Moreover, as it is, the town meeting does not have to fund a staffing proposal, and is allowed to make contingent appropriations under par. (m). From a public policy perspective, the town’s interpretation

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of G.L. c. 59, § 21C, would “render virtually ineffective” the collective bargaining statute, Mendes v. Taunton, supra at 113-114, because it would allow town officials to negotiate an agreement without any obligation to present it, as negotiated, for a vote by the town meeting. See note 8, supra.
Conclusion. A declaratory judgment shall enter that town officials may not fulfil their obligation under G.L. c. 150E, § 7
(b), by submitting a budget that makes full funding of a staffing provision contained in a multiyear collective bargaining agreement contingent on town voters approving a potential property tax override pursuant to G.L. c. 59, § 21C.

So ordered.

SOSMAN, J. (dissenting, with whom Marshall, C.J., and Cordy, J., join).

The sole issue before us is whether the town manager and the board of selectmen of Framingham submitted to “the appropriate legislative body . . . a request for an appropriation necessary to fund the cost items” of the town’s collective bargaining agreement with the plaintiff union. G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b). It is undisputed that they submitted “a request for an appropriation” to the town meeting, and undisputed that the requested budget included an amount sufficient to cover all of the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. The court today concludes that that “request for an appropriation necessary to fund the cost items” of the agreement fails to satisfy G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), because it was submitted pursuant to G.L. c. 59, § 21C (m), which allows a town to “appropriate from the tax levy, from available funds, or from borrowing, contingent on the passage of a ballot question” under what is popularly referred to as “Proposition 2 ½.” Nothing in G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), places any restriction on what form the requested “appropriation” must take, and there is no reason to believe that the term “appropriation” would not include an “appropriation” made pursuant to G.L. c. 59, § 21C (m). The identical term, a well-recognized term of art in government finance, is used in both statutes, and we should not give that technical term different meanings in the two statutes.

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The court today reads into G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), a requirement that there be nothing “conditional” or “contingent” about the appropriation request and, therefore, that the contingencies associated with voter approval of a Proposition 2 ½ override mean that a request for an “appropriation” under G.L. c. 59, § 21C (m), cannot satisfy the town employer’s obligation under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b). The statute contains no such requirement. Inherent in any appropriation request submitted to “the appropriate legislative body” under § 7 (b) is the risk that that “legislative body” may refuse the request, and there is nothing that an employer can do to couch “a request for an appropriation” in a manner that eliminates the condition that the request be approved. Indeed, the statute itself recognizes that distinct possibility: “If the appropriate legislative body duly rejects the request for an appropriation necessary to fund the cost items [of the collective bargaining agreement], such cost items shall be returned to the parties for further bargaining.” G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b). See Saugus v. Newbury, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 611 (1983) (when town meeting rejected selectmen’s request for appropriation to fund second year of agreed minimum staffing provision, provision became unenforceable). See also Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. Boston, 382 Mass. 553, 560 (1981) (§ 7 [b] required mayor to submit appropriation request to city council, but “[city] council may appropriate the necessary funds or may reject the request”); Mendes v. Taunton, 366 Mass. 109, 118-119 (1974) (same under predecessor statute).

While there is no requirement that the appropriation request somehow be made in a manner that avoids any contingency about its approval (as such a requirement would be a legal impossibility), what has emerged in the jurisprudence surrounding § 7 (b) is the requirement that the government employer submitting the request affirmatively support that request and affirmatively strive to get it approved. The town officials may not shirk their obligations by failing to submit any request (see Billerica v International Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1495, 415 Mass. 692, 696 [1993]), nor may they speak out against full funding for the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement (see Town of Belmont, 22 M.L.C. 1636, 1639-1641

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Subsequent to the enactment of G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), the voters enacted G.L. c. 59, § 21C. See St. 1980, c. 580, § 1. Section 21C now imposes limitations and requirements on municipal finance that did not exist previously, and a municipality’s ability to fund its collective bargaining agreements is unavoidably subject to the constraints of that statute. Specifically, cities and towns may not assess taxes in excess of two and one-half per cent of the valuation of all real estate and personal property located within their boundaries, and the assessed taxes for any given year may not exceed 102 ½% of the prior year’s levy limit (absent certain exceptions). G.L. c. 59, § 21C (b), (f). However, if a city or town wishes to assess taxes in amounts above those limits, it may do so by submitting a question to the voters and obtaining a majority vote in favor of that higher assessment. G.L. c. 59, § 21C (g), (i ½), (j), (k).

Of importance to the present case is § 21C (m), which allows a “town” to make an “appropriation” contingent on voter approval of assessments in excess of the otherwise applicable limits. The town “may appropriate from the tax levy, from available funds, or from borrowing, contingent on the passage of a ballot question,” but “the appropriation vote shall not be deemed to take effect until the approval of the ballot

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question.”[1] § 21C (m). In other words, as here, a town may approve a budget that is premised on the passage of an override, and thereby make “appropriations,” but the required steps of an election and voter approval must be completed before those “appropriations” are effective. Notwithstanding the complexity of those steps, and notwithstanding whatever uncertainty there may be about their successful completion at the time the process is initiated, the result is a lawful “appropriation” of funds for the stated purpose. A request for an “appropriation” under § 21C (m) is simply one form of requesting an “appropriation,” and the fact that final approval of such an “appropriation” request involves approval by both the town meeting and the voters themselves does not make it any less an “appropriation.”

Here, the town of Framingham has a representative town meeting, with twelve town meeting members from each of eighteen precincts. For purposes of making “appropriations,” the town meeting is the “town.” See G.L.c. 40, § 5 (“town may at any town meeting appropriate money for the exercise of any of its corporate powers”). Thus, the provision in G.L.c. 59, § 21C (m), allowing a “town” to make appropriations contingent on voter approval of an override, refers to appropriations made at town meeting. The town meeting is also a “legislative body” for purposes of requests for appropriations to fund collective bargaining agreements under G.L.c. 150E. See G.L.c. 150E, § 1 (defining “[l]egislative body” as “the city council or town meeting in the case of a city, town or district”).

There is some suggestion in today’s opinion that this form of appropriation request would not satisfy G.L.c. 150E, § 7 (b), because the voters are not a “legislative body,” and because the board of selectmen (also not a “legislative body”) is the branch of town government that must place an override question before the voters. G.L.c. 59, § 21C (a), (g). This terminology is no ground for concern. In the first place, it is the town meeting

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that makes the “appropriation” under G.L. c. 59, § 21C (m): when the board of selectmen and town manager submitted the requested budget to the town meeting and asked its members to approve it, they were submitting that request for an “appropriation” to the “appropriate legislative body.” G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b). The voters do not make the “appropriation,” but instead approve the increased assessment that makes the “appropriation” legally effective. More importantly, to the extent that § 21C (m) pragmatically means that the voters must approve the “appropriation,” even the voters would come within the definition of “legislative body” for purposes of G.L. c. 150E: the definition of “[l]egislative body” includes not only the “town meeting,” but also “any body which has the power of appropriation with respect to any employer.” G.L. c. 150E, § 1. Thus, to the extent that the voters are part of the “appropriation” process for an appropriation under § 21C (m), they comprise a “legislative body” for purposes of G.L. c. 150E.

With regard to the submission of an override question to the voters, it is the board of selectmen that has the authority to submit such a question. See G.L. c. 59, § 21C (a), (g).[2] Here, the board of selectmen and the town manager submitted the appropriation request to the town meeting (the body that had the power to make an “appropriation”), and the board of selectmen submitted a ballot question for the voters to decide. Concerns that the town meeting itself could not submit the question to the voters poses no obstacle under G.L. c. 150E, § 7
(b). The wellestablished requirement that the employer affirmatively support its own request for appropriation would require the board of selectmen to proceed with the ballot question necessary to make the “appropriation” effective.

There is no suggestion on this record that the board of selectmen

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harbored any secret intention to obtain town meeting approval of the budget they recommended and then sabotage that same budget by failing to submit a ballot question to the voters.[3]
Indeed, the town manager and the board of selectmen were unabashed in their “pitch” to the town meeting about their recommendation of the budget and its accompanying override vote. There is no doubt about the sincerity or the enthusiastic effort that they put forth to use this funding mechanism to obtain full funding for the collective bargaining agreement and, along with it, the needs of other town departments. Nor can their good faith efforts be assailed as so unrealistic, or so dubious of success, as to not constitute a legitimate “request for an appropriation.” The override question was ultimately submitted to the voters, and it passed, even without the added urgency it would have had had the staffing requirements for an essential service like the fire department been part of the override and had the union added its endorsement to the override campaign.

Ignoring the fact that what was submitted to the town meeting was a budget request including an amount for full funding of the minimum staffing requirement, the union protested that the companion “balanced budget” did not contain that full funding. That “balanced budget” was not the budget that the town manager and the board of selectmen requested — instead, they submitted that alternative budget to demonstrate what the budget would look like (and what drastic reductions in all town departments and programs would ensue) without the requested override. At no point did they indicate to the town meeting that that was the budget they wanted the town meeting to approve. Instead, they were unambiguous in their request that the town meeting approve the budget that included full funding of the fire fighters minimum staffing, and made clear their commitment to seek the voter approval that would make that appropriation effective.

In today’s fiscal climate, Proposition 2½ override votes are a regular component of municipal finance. Whereas a municipality’s

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prerogative to decide such policy questions as funding for minimum staffing used to reside solely in the elected representatives comprising the municipality’s legislative branch, Proposition 2½ now sometimes places that prerogative directly in the hands of the voters themselves. Rather than seek to harmonize G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), with G.L. c. 59, § 21C, today’s decision seeks to exclude collective bargaining agreements from this modern form of municipal budgeting. I believe the two statutes can readily be harmonized, and I see no reason why full funding for collective bargaining agreements cannot be sought using the mechanism of a Proposition 2½ override. If city and town officials may not use that mechanism to meet their obligations under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), their ability to afford such items as minimum staffing will be reduced, and their willingness to agree to such cost items in collective bargaining agreements must correspondingly diminish. I see nothing in G.L. c. 150E, § 7
(b), or in the jurisprudence surrounding the obligation that it imposes, that would compel that unfortunate result. I therefore respectfully dissent.

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