No. 2004-02378-A.Commonwealth of Massachusetts Superior Court. WORCESTER, SS.
January 19, 2006.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
AGNES, JR., J.
1. This is a civil action in which the plaintiff, Raheem Rasheed Abubardar (hereafter “plaintiff”), an inmate serving a sentence in a Massachusetts Correctional facility, seeks equitable relief and declaratory judgment as a result of the imposition of a disciplinary sanction by the defendants. The defendant Steven O’Brien (hereafter “defendant O’Brien”) is the Superintendent of the North Central Correction Institution and the defendant David Christian (hereafter, “defendant Christian”) is a Massachusetts Corrections Officer. The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment.
2. On August 11, 2004, the plaintiff was lawfully incarcerated at North Central Correctional Institution (“NCCI”), a level 4 medium security institution in Gardner, Massachusetts. At the time of this event, the Inmate Orientation Handbook (“Handbook”) did not specifically identify running inside the prison as a prohibited behavior. However, the subject of running inside the institution was a matter that was of concern to defendant O’Brien because it could lead to physical confrontations between inmates or between inmates and correctional officers, including problems associated with inmates trying to get ahead of each other in line at the dining hall. There also was a concern that the sight of inmates running could lead the staff to believe an escape was in progress or some other infraction had occurred. For this reason, defendant O’Brien brought the issue to the attention of staff and inmates and instructed them that running by inmates was not permitted, and that when observed by staff it should be stopped. See Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Affidavit of defendant O’Brien, paragraphs 4-11 (“defendant O’Brien aff.”).
3. On August 11, 2004, the plaintiff was in the general population at NCCI. The plaintiff made a practice of attending daily prayer services with other Muslim inmates. The plaintiff also regularly visited the institution’s law library. On the day and at the time in question, the plaintiff was on his way to the dining hall and was hurrying to get there because he was late. According to defendant Christian, the plaintiff was “running.” According to the plaintiff, he was “hurrying” but not running. The plaintiff was informally disciplined for a violation of the institution’s policies. He was penalized by an order restricting him to his housing unit for three days. Defendant O’Brien agreed with the plaintiff’s statement that the Handbook did not specifically mention this issue and decided to amend it. The handbook now includes this rule: “No running from units to programs allowed. Inmates caught running shall be subject to disciplinary action.” defendant O’Brien aff. Para. 12. At some later point after this incident, the plaintiff was transferred from NCII to MCI Norfolk where he was placed in a segregated unit.[1]
5. Whether the plaintiff was actually “running” or, in his words “hurrying” within the institution may be a matter in dispute, but it is not a disputed fact of consequence to the outcome of this case. A three-day restriction such as the one imposed in this case is a “minor, informal discipline.” It limits an inmate’s access to recreational activities, but not to programs and religious activities. See Defendant O’Brien aff., para. 13. There is nothing in the regulations or policies which the parties have included in the record in this case that supports the plaintiff’s claim that the housing restriction prohibited him from participating in communal prayer services. See Defendant O’Brien aff. Paragraphs 14-15. Moreover, even if the restriction did have such an effect, the plaintiff had two options available to challenge such a penalty. One option is to speak to a supervising officer and the other is to request formal discipline which could then be challenged at a prison disciplinary hearing. Defendant O’Brien aff., para. 13. The plaintiff did not choose either option.
6. The plaintiff elected to pursue the institution’s grievance procedure as a remedy in this case. Under established policy at NCII, inmates are afforded an opportunity to file a “formal grievance” to resolve any complaint within the institution that does not involve formal discipline or classification. See Defendants’ Memorandum in support of summary judgment at 5 (quoting excerpts from inmate handbooks about the grievance process. In this case, the plaintiff’s formal grievance (logged in at NCII as number 5174) was partially approved when defendant O’Brien decided to include a specific written prohibition against running in the Handbook, but otherwise denied. See Defendants’ Memorandum in support of summary judgment at 5.
7. Use of the grievance procedure as opposed to the formal disciplinary process was a free and voluntary choice made by the plaintiff. As such, he is not entitled to the full panoply of due process protections that are applicable to the formal disciplinary process. An inmate is entitled to the protection of procedural due process under the Federal and State Constitutions only if there is an existing liberty or property interest at stake. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); Torres v. Commissioner of Correction, 427 Mass. 611, 617, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 (1998). Under the provisions of the Handbook, Chapter 23, Grievance Procedure, the complaint is resolved with finality within the institution. A three day housing restriction does not implicate a liberty interest enjoyed by the plaintiff because it does not constitute an “atypical and significant hardship on an inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, supra, 515 U.S. at 484-86
(Holding that a prisoner’s confinement in segregation for thirty days because of a disciplinary violation “did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.”). Contrast Haverty v. Commissioner of Correction, 437 Mass. at 750 (Confinement of inmates to institution’s East Wing was tantamount to confinement in former segregation unit and as such is a severe deprivation of an inmate’s liberty that it cannot be carried out unless due process safeguards set forth in the department’s regulations [103 Code Mass. Regs. 421.00 et seq.] are observed).
ORDER
In light of this court’s conclusion that a 3 day housing restriction impacting only the plaintiff inmate’s recreational activities which the plaintiff elected to challenge by means of the optional grievance procedure did not affect the inmate’s liberty interests, there is no basis for any equitable relief or for a declaratory judgment. Therefore, the defendants’ motions for summary judgment are ALLOWED. The plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.